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I

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE: C"I i J RT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-82.53(2), -86(1994), and § 6346b-16(1993).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the Industrial Commission of Utah properly exclude from
evidence a medical report from Dr. Scott Knorpp on the grounds
that the Petitioners, Stampede Trucking and the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah (hereinafter "WCF"), did not submit it
within one week of the hearing as required by Utah Admin. Code
R568-1-4.J?

The WCF provided Dr. Knorpp's report to Kimball (the

injured worker) less than two hours before the hearing and did
not provide the report to the Commission until after the hearing
had begun.

(R. at 364-69) .

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
1.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) and

(iv)(1993), the appellate court determines whether the

agency's

application of the rule, in this case R568-1-4.J, was reasonable
and rational by applying an intermediate standard of review.
Thorup Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Auditing Div., 860 P2d. 324, 327
(Utah 1993).

1

2.

Before the appellate court can review an agency action

under U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii), the Petitioners must
establish a prima facie case that the action was contrary to
prior practice.

If a prima facie case is shown, the agency must

"demonstrate a fair and rational" basis for its action.

Pickett

v. Utah Dept. of Comm., 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993)(citing
SEMCO v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah
1993)(Durham, J., dissenting)).

In this case, the Petitioners

have not presented any evidence showing that the Industrial
Commission's application of R568-1-4.J is contrary to agency
policy, let alone, establishing a prima facie case.
3.

The Petitioners argue that the exclusion of Dr. Knorpp's

report was tantamount to either a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for
failure to state a claim or a Rule 56 dismissal for summary
judgment.

However, both Rule 12(b)(6) and 56 concern dismissing

an entire case when the proper motion is made.

Neither a

12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim nor a 56 motion for
summary judgment was made or granted.

The case was still tried

on its merits.
4.

To determine whether a medical panel should have been

convened, the Court applies an abuse of discretion standard.
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Comm'n, 703 P.2d 306, 308
(Utah 1985);

Workers' Comp Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d

572, 577 (Utah App. 1988).

2

Ill

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following statutes and Rules, of which the full text can
be found in the appendix, are determinative in this appeal:
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.

Pleadings and Discovery.

J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or
its insurance carrier as a single joint medical exhibit at
least one week before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must
cooperate and submit all pertinent medical records contained
in his file to the employer or its insurance carrier for the
joint exhibit submission two weeks in advance of the
scheduled hearing. Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed
binder arranged by a care provider in chronological order.
Exhibits should include all relevant treatment records with
the exception of hospital nurses notes.
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9.
Panel•

Guidelines for Utilization of Medical

Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts
the following guidelines in determining the necessity of
submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law
Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue
must be shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant medical issues are involved when there
are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5%
of the whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more
than 90 days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting
to more than $2,000.

3

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before
commission and hearing examiner - Admissible evidence.
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be
bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of procedure,
other than as herein provided or as adopted by the
commission pursuant to this act. The commission may make
its investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workers'
Compensation Act.
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof
of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and
relevant including, but not limited to the following:
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open
hearings.
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of
pathologists.
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the
commission.
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time
sheets, book accounts or other records.
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or
diseased employee.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16.
adjudicative proceedings.

Judicial review - Formal

(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its
face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied
the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow
prescribed procedure;
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject
to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice,
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Petitioners seek review of the Industrial Commission's

Order denying their Motion for Review of the ALJ's grant of
Worker's Compensation benefits.

The WCF had Kimball seen by

their Independent Medical Examination physician who completely
agreed with Kimball's treating physician on all medical aspects
of the case.

There was no conflicting evidence concerning this

case until the WCF tried to introduce a file review by Dr. Knorpp
after the trial before the Industrial Commission had already
begun.

That file review was excluded because it was in violation

of Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.J.

With no conflicting medical

evidence in the case, the ALJ and the Industrial Commission did
not seek the opinion of a medical panel and awarded benefits to

5

Kimball.

The Petitioners now seek to have Dr. Knorpp's report

admitted into evidence and the case retried.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Kimball filed an Application for Hearing on October 25,

1994.

(R. at 2-5). He was requesting medical treatment and

temporary total compensation that both the treating physician and
the WCF's doctor had prescribed.

On November 1, 1994, the

Industrial Commission of Utah filed a Request for Answer on
Stampede Trucking and the WCF.

On November 14, 1994, Stampede

Trucking and the WCF filed their Answer.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted the hearing on
March 7, 1995, and entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order on April 19, 1995.

(R. at 252-269).

The ALJ

found that Dr. Knorpp's report was inadmissible because (a)
Dr. Knorpp had not examined Kimball and (b) the WCF is entitled
to only one IME under Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.H.
The WCF filed a Motion for Review on May 18, 1995 and
Kimball filed a Response to the Defendants' Motion on May 30,
1995.

(R at 271-84; 350-60).
Although the Industrial Commission disagreed with the ALJ's

Conclusions of Law

concerning Dr. Knorpp's report, it denied

WCF's Motion for Review on September 29, 1995 stating that
Dr. Knorpp's report was inadmissible evidence because the WCF did
not file it within the time limits set by R568-1-4.J.

The

Commission determined that a medical panel was not necessary and
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that the ALJ's findings and decision were sufficient, and
reemphasized the following:
1. Since July 1994, Kimball has been treated for
frontal occipital headaches, severe neck and shoulder
pain, and myofacial syndrome.
2. The conditions were medically caused by the March
15, 1993 industrial accident.
3. The treatment rendered through [December 31] 1994
was reasonable and necessary.
4. Kimball was temporarily totally disabled after July
22, 1994 until at least January 1, 1995. (R. at 36469) .
The WCF filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 18,
1995 and Kimball filed a Response to the Motion for
Reconsideration on November 1, 1995.

(R. at 372-81; R. at 461-

68) .
The Industrial Commission denied the WCF's Motion for
Reconsideration on November 1, 1995 for the following reasons:
1. No support was given for the assertion that it is
customary to violate R568-1-4.J.
2. 35-1-108 (1) (B) (1) commonly refers to "managed
health care" and is inapplicable to the case.
3. Willardson does not justify convening a medical
panel because no conflicting evidence was on the record
in the case at hand. (R. at 469-72).
After the Industrial Commission denied the Petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration, the Petitioners filed this appeal.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 15, 1993, John Kimball sustained a compensable

industrial injury when he was involved in a motor vehicle
accident while driving in the course and scope of his employment
with Stampede Trucking.

(R. at 253). Kimball received both

temporary total disability compensation and medical expenses from

7

the WCF.

He was released to work on July 22, 1993 although he

was greatly restricted and still injured.
continued to work until July

(R. at 234-35).

He

22, 1994, at which time he obtained

additional medical treatment as a result of the industrial
injury.

The WCF denied payment for the additional treatments and

temporary total disability compensation for the period beginning
July 22, 1994, deeming the treatments medically unnecessary and
not causally related to the March 15, 1993 industrial injury.
(R. at 253) .
At that time, the Petitioners ordered an independent medical
examination (IME) of Kimball and promised to pay any additional
compensation if the IME indicated that it would be required.
at 6, 2 61).

(R.

The WCF chose Dr. J. Criss Yelton to perform the IME

on October 5, 1994.

(R. at 6 ) . The IME indicated that the

Respondents' medical treatment was appropriate, that he had not
stabilized, and that a maximum medical improvement would probably
take another six months.

(R. at 37, 41-42).

However, the WCF

still refused to pay any benefits, and they put Kimball under
surveillance on November 7, 8, and 9, 1994.

Nevertheless, the

surveillance became problematic for the WCF because it showed
only that Kimball was impaired and disabled.

(R. at 521-22).

On approximately January 12, 1995, the WCF telephoned
Kimball's counsel and offered a completely unsatisfactory
settlement offer.
day.

Kimball rejected the offer later that same

(R. at 454).
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Shortly thereafter, the WCF telephoned Kimball's counsel a
second time to suggest a direct referral to a medical panel.
Kimball immediately rejected this proposal also because there was
no conflicting medical evidence or any reason for the WCF to not
pay full benefits.

(R. 354, 454).

On February 14, 1995, the WCF sent a letter (commonly
referred to as a Rule 490-1-4.J letter) to Kimball's counsel
stating that the deadline for submitting additional records to
the joint exhibit would be one week before the date of trial as
outlined in R568-1-4.J.

(R. at 459, 460).

The Petitioners, in their Statement of Facts, state the
following:

"Counsel [meaning Kimball's counsel] elected to put

off receiving and reviewing the [medical] exhibit until the day
of the hearing."

(Petitioners' brief at 11, Line 5 ) . They then

state, "He [Kimball's counsel] actually received Dr. Knorpp's
report by fax before he received the medical records exhibit,"
(Petitioners' brief at 19, Lines 8-10)(emphasis added), and
"Counsel for Kimball opted to have WCF deliver the exhibit to him
on the day of hearing."

(Petitioners' brief at 19, Lines 5-6).

These statements are simply not true.

On February 20, 1995,

Kimball's counsel telephoned the WCF and requested the complete
medical exhibit in the Kimball case.

On February 22, 1995,

the

WCF sent the complete medical exhibit to Kimball's counsel with a
cover letter dated February 22, 1995.

(Appendix B ) .

The Petitioners also argued that they were delayed in
referring this case to Dr. Knorpp for their file review because
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they needed additional medical records.
assertion is misleading.

Unfortunately, this

The medical exhibit packet sent to

Kimball on February 22, 1995 is exactly the same packet that
Dr. Knorpp reviewed.

It is also the same packet that was

presented to the Industrial Commission and Kimball as the medical
exhibit in this case.

(see Appendix B ) .

The Respondents are

extremely disappointed that the Petitioners would try to mislead
the Court of Appeals in this manner.
Kimball had the total medical record exhibit on February 23,
1995, and used such, as usual, to prepare for trial.

In fact, on

or about February 28, 1995, the WCF requested that, because they
had problems obtaining the latest reports from Kimball's treating
physician, Mr. Kimball bring them with him when he came to the
hearing.
him.

Kimball agreed and brought these medical records with

(R. at 529, Lines 15-25).
On March 6, 1995 (the night before the trial), at 5:43 p.m.,

the WCF faxed Kimball's counsel a copy of Dr. Knorpp's medical
report.

(R. at 454, 477). Kimball's counsel had only two

business hours to review the report before the hearing, half of
which was spent driving to Salt Lake for the trial.

This two-

hour period was also the only time Kimball had to formulate any
objections to the report.

(R. at 356). The Industrial

Commission did not receive the report until after the hearing had
begun.

(R. at 477).

During the hearing, Kimball's counsel apologized to the
WCF's attorney and the ALJ because he had forgotten to bring the
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recent medical reports from Kimball's treating physician that the
WCF had requested.

By stipulation, the record was left open so

those records could be made part of the medical exhibit.

(R. at

529) .
V

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission correctly applied Utah Admin. Code
R568-1-4.J to exclude Dr. Knorpp's medical report from the
hearing on Kimball's Workers' Compensation claim.

This is

because it was not introduced into evidence until after the trial
had begun.

If the medical report had been admitted, it would

have been a trial by surprise.

This would have been unfair to

the Commission whose duty it is to run an efficient and fair
tribunal and it would have greatly prejudiced the opposing party.
The Industrial Commission would be in chaos if numerous
conflicting medical exhibits were allowed to be introduced for
the first time at trial (i.e. the Functional Capacity Test,
rehabilitation evaluations, file review or IMEs).

If this were

allowed to happen, no one, including the parties or the Judge,
could adequately prepare for trial.
Kimball specifically objected to Knorpp's report at the
trial and presented the timeliness argument (R568-1-4.J) at the
Motion for Review level.

At trial, Kimball did not have adequate

time to prepare all-inclusive objections to the admission of the
report.

This constituted an exceptional circumstance and allowed
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Kimball to properly raise objections in his Response to the
Defendants1 Motion for Review.

The Petitioners have not shown

any proof that the agency's action was against prior practice nor
that the action was contrary to the rule.

Because Dr. Knorpp's

report was not admitted into evidence and was not part of the
record, there were no medical opinions in controversy.
Therefore, a medical panel was not necessary for this case.
VI
ARGUMENT
A*
DR. KNORPP / S MEDICAL REPORT I S INADMISSABLE EVIDENCE
BECAUSE WCF DID NOT SUBMIT IT WITHIN THE ONE WEEK TIME LIMIT
UNDER R568-1-4.J.
The Industrial Commission had the authority to bar Dr.
Knorpp's report because the WCF had not filed it according to
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.J independently of the ALJ's reasoning
prohibiting it from becoming evidence.

"While it is the ALJ who

initially hears the evidence, the Commission is the ultimate fact
finder."

Chase v. Industrial Comm'n, 872 P2d. 475, 479 (Utah

App. 1994) (quoting Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P2d. 1284,
1287 (Utah App. 1990)) .
R568-1-4.J states:
All medical records shall be filed by the employer or
its insurance carrier as a single joint medical exhibit
at least one week before the scheduled hearing.
Claimant must cooperate and submit all pertinent
medical records contained in his file to the employer
or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit
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submission two weeks in advance of the scheduled
hearing. . . .
(emphasis added).

This rule was enacted to facilitate the speedy

and fair adjudication of claims at the Industrial Commission.

To

allow medical reports to be submitted at the hearing would create
confusion for the ALJ and opposing counsel and slow or stop the
entire adjudication process.

Time limits are set to give counsel

the appropriate time required to prepare for trial.

Two hours of

work time is not enough to even properly review a lengthy report,
let alone prepare any possible objections to a surprise argument.
Although the Utah legislature has eased the rules of
evidence for the Commission, it did not give the Commission
authority to allow any and all evidence into trial.

Utah Code

Ann. § 35-1-88(1994) states:
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall
be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of
procedure, other than as herein provided or as adopted
by the commission pursuant to this act. The commission
may make its investigation in such manner as in its
judgment is best calculated to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out
justly the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act.
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof
of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and
relevant including, but not limited to the following:
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the
commission.

(emphasis added).

The statute does not compel the Commission to

allow in any evidence;

however, it does require the Commission
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to abide by rules of evidence "adopted by the commission."

R568-

1-4.J is one of these rules that was specifically enacted for the
Industrial Commission and it falls under the statute.
By leaving out the emphasized clause, "... other than as
herein provided or as adopted by the Commission pursuant to this
act," from the statute, the Petitioners, in their brief, would
have the Court believe that the Commission does not have any
rules of evidence and that any evidence is admissible at any
time.
What the Petitioners have done and argued is like quoting
the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States of America
while leaving out the phrase, "...secure the Blessings of Liberty
to ourselves and our posterity..." and then argue that the
Preamble contains nothing about liberty.

This argument and

interpretation is erroneous.
Furthermore, there are no records, or any evidence
whatsoever, supporting the assertion that it is customary for the
Industrial Commission to violate the rule (R568-1-4.J) by
supplementing the medical exhibit at the hearing.

(R. at 470).

The Petitioners rely only on the fact that the ALJ allowed
Kimball to supplement medical records post-hearing.

However,

they do not state that these records were requested by them.
These were the medical records Kimball had brought with him from
Indiana at the Petitioner's request.

Unfortunately, Kimball's

counsel left those records at his office.
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The ALJ simply left

the record open so the recent medical records the Petitioners
wanted could be incorporated.
It is a tenuous argument at best to stipulate, as the
Petitioners do, that medical records should be added to the
medical exhibit post-hearing, and then present this evidence to
the Court as the only evidence that the Commission customarily
violates Rule R568-1-4.J.
In this case, all medical records in evidence, namely
Dr. Humphreys', Dr. Yelton's, Dr. Fenwick's and Dr. Matick's
reports, indicate that Kimball's medical problems are appropriate
considering his industrial injury and that they are causally
linked to that industrial injury.

The Commission and the ALJ

correctly based their decisions on these reports and ruled
against allowing Dr. Knorpp's report into evidence because it was
not presented in a timely manner.

The records received post-

hearing were only records of Kimball's recent treatment, were of
no significance to the case, and were requested by the
Petitioners.

Moreover, both parties stipulated that the evidence

would be allowed into the record post-hearing.

(R. at 529).

Therefore, the Commission was acting properly when it did not
allow Dr. Knorpp's report into evidence because it was not
submitted at least one week before the hearing.
B.

KIMBALL PROPERLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF TIMELINESS.
Kimball properly raised the issue of timeliness at trial

when he said, ". . . based upon this late file review," (R. at

15

483, Line 7) and again when he said, "It [the file review] is too
little too late," (R. at 486, Line 19). In section III of the
argument in his Response to the Defendants' Motion for Review,
Kimball again raised the issue of timeliness.

(R. at 355-56).

See Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n, 855 P2d. 267, 268 (Utah App.
1993).

An issue must be put to the administrative agency before

it may be raised on appeal, and in this case the Industrial
Commission explicitly ruled on the issue of timeliness twice,
both in its Order Denying Motion for Review and its Order Denying
Request for Reconsideration.

Additionally, it only becomes

"error to adjudicate issues not raised at trial" when those
issues could have been, but were not, raised in the pleadings.
See Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm'n, 897 P2d. 352, 356 (Utah
App. 1995).

Because the issue of timeliness did not arise until

the day of trial, it could not have been in the pre-trial
pleadings.

Therefore, mentioning at the trial that the file

review was late and again in the Response to the Defendants'
Motion for Review was the proper place to raise the issue.
Even if this Court determines that Kimball did not
adequately raised the issue at trial, he can still raise it at
the appellate level under the following law:
Generally a [party] who fails to bring an issue before
the trial court is barred from asserting it initially
on a p p e a l . . . .
However, there are two limited but well-established
exceptions to this rule. An appellate court may
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address [an] issue for the first time on appeal if:
(1) the court committed "plain error"; or (2) there are
"exceptional circumstances." (citations omitted).

The second exception to the rule prohibiting
consideration of issues for the first time on appeal is
a catch-all device requiring "exceptional" or "unusual"
circumstances. It is a safety device to make certain
that manifest injustice does not result from the
failure to consider an issue on appeal. Both the Utah
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have often
acknowledged this exception.
State v. Archambeau, 820 P2d. 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991);

See

73A C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure 191 n.93
(1983).

Because the Respondent's counsel did not receive Dr.

Knorpp's report until two business hours before the hearing, he
did not have adequate time to prepare extensive or conclusive
arguments to object to the report.

(R. at 356). The purpose of

R568-1-4.J is to avoid this type of attack.

Accordingly, having

only two hours to derive a defense does create an "exceptional"
circumstance that justifies raising the issue initially in the
Court of Appeals.
Injustice would result if surprise evidence were allowed
into trial because every possible defense or objection could not
be made to its admission.

Evidence would always be admitted late

if this were the case because it would give the party admitting
it an advantage.

For example, in this case, the cover letter

sent to Dr. Knorpp with the medical records could be helpful to
Kimball's position.

The letter was not voluntarily produced and
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because of the violation of the rules Kimball never had a chance
to procure such.
The Petitioners argue that this would not have prejudiced
Kimball because he chose not to review the medical records
exhibit until the day of the hearing.

Once again, the

Petitioners are misrepresenting the facts.

After receiving

Petitioners' letter dated February 14, 1995, the Respondent
telephoned the legal adjuster for this case and requested a copy
of the complete medical exhibit on February 20, 1995.

The WCF

sent a copy of the complete exhibit with a cover letter dated
February 22, 1995.

(Appendix B ) .

This medical exhibit is

identical to the medical exhibit the Respondents received at
hearing.
In addition, Kimball is not dependent on the WCF's medical
records in that he collected his own medical records.
From the arguments, it is clear that the Respondents raised R5681-4.J in a timely manner.
C.

THIS CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE A MEDICAL PANEL.
The Industrial Commission is only required to convene a

medical panel in a limited number of circumstances as outlined in
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9, which states:
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission
adopts the following guidelines in determining the
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
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1. One or more significant medical issues
may be involved. Generally a significant
medical issue must be shown by conflicting
medical reports. Significant medical issues
are involved when there are:
(c) Medical expenses in controversy
amounting to more than $2,000.
(emphasis added).

This rule shows that having medical expenses

in excess of $2,000 by itself is not sufficient to convene a
medical panel, but that the expenses must be in controversy.
However, to have medical expenses in controversy there must be
reports on record that dispute the expenses.

See Chase v.

Industrial Comm'n, 872 P2d. 475, 479-80 (Utah App. 1994);
Willardson v. Industrial Comm'n, 904 P2d. 671 (Utah 1995).
The Respondents admit that the Willardson case does expand
the use of medical panels outlined in U.C.A. §35-1-77.

However,

in the Willardson case, the Commission gave little weight to the
admitted medical records of the two treating physicians.

In this

case, the medical record in question was ruled inadmissible.
Because Dr. Knorpp's report was not admissible evidence, there is
no medical conflict or controversy.

Further, all of the reports

from every other doctor Kimball saw [Dr. Humphreys, Dr. Yelton
(who is the WCF's physician), Dr. Fenwick and Dr. Matick] agree
that the expenses were justified.

(R. at 368).

Additionally, the Petitioners were not prejudiced by the
exclusion of Dr. Knorpp's report because it would have been
entitled to very little weight had it been admitted.
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(R. at

3 67).

The report would have had little persuasive value because

Dr. Knorpp did not personally examine Kimball, did not even talk
with Kimball, is not a specialist in the appropriate field, and
had no actual diagnostic studies to facilitate him in his file
review as is required by the American Medical Association's
guidelines, which have been adopted in this jurisdiction.
507).

(R. at

Even if Dr. Knorpp's report had been admitted, using the

above reasoning, the case was not mandated to go to a medical
panel contrary to the Petitioner's interpretation of Willardson.
VII

CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission properly excluded Dr. Knorpp's
report as medical evidence under Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.J.
There are no reported exceptions to this rule, and there is no
evidence before this Court showing that the action was contrary
to prior agency policy.
The Respondent timely objected to Dr. Knorpp's report.
However, even if the Court finds that he did not, Kimball did not
have time to prepare all-encompassing objections to the admission
of Dr. Knorpp's report into evidence, which creates a recognized
exception to the general rule of raising issues.

Because Dr.

Knorpp's report is not admissible evidence, there are no medical
expenses in controversy and the Industrial Commission properly
ruled that a medical panel was not necessary.
20

The Respondents are disappointed with the Petitioners'
continued attempts to distort the facts in this case, and they
believe that the creative editing of statutes and rules to convey
false interpretations to be inappropriate.
Furthermore, the Petitioners have again failed to be prompt
in this case.

A copy of the Petitioners's Brief was attested to

be sent to the Respondents on June 21, 1996 although the mailing
label shows it was sent on June 24.

(Appendix B ) .

For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should uphold the
decision of the Industrial Commission and order the Petitioners
to comply with the ALJ's Order.

DATED this

1&-

day of

1996

^

T-

C

lyr^-—

T. Jdjf^jsy Cottle
Counsel for Respondent
John R. Kimball
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
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postage prepaid, on this
^h^1
day of July, 1996 to the
following:
James R. Black
James R. Black, P.C.
349 South 200 East, Suite 310
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Alan L. Hennebold
Industrial Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Barbara W. Sharp
Workers' Comp. Fund of Utah
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Carrie T. Taylor
Workers' Comp. Fund of Utah
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

T. JefffeA^/Cgttle
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APPENDIX A

Utah Admin, woae
A. For the purposes of Section 63-46b-3, U.1
, all
adjudicative proceedings for workers' compensation and
occupational disease claims shall only be commenced by the
injured worker or dependent filing a request for agency
action with the Commission. The Administrative Law Judge Is
afforded discretion in allowing intervention of other
parties pursuant to Section 63-46b-9, U.C.A. The
Application for Hearing is the request for agency action.
All such applications shall include supporting medical
documentation of the claim where there is a dispute over
medical issues. Applications without supporting
documentation will not be mailed to the employer ox
insurance carrier for answer until the appropriate documents
have been provided.
B. Whenever a claim, for compensation benefits Is denied by
an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on the
applicant to initiate the action by filing an Application
for Hearing with the Commission
C. Whenever an Application for Hearing is filed with the
Commission, the Commission shall forthwith mail a copy to
the employer or" to the employer's Insurance carrier.
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 3 0 days
following the date of the mailing of the application to file
a written answer with the Industrial Commission, admitting
or denying liability for the claim. The answer should state
all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail
that an applicant may be fully Informed of the nature of the
defense asserted. All answers shall include a summary and
categorization of benefits paid to date on the claim. A
copy shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is one, t :
the applicant's attorney by the defendant.
E. When an employer or Insurance carrier fails to file an
answer within the 3 0 days provided above, the Commission may
enter a default against such employer or insurance carrier.
The Commission may then set the matter for hearing, take
evidence bearing on the claim, and enter an Order based on
the evidence presented. Such defaults may be set aside by
following the procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Said default shall apply to the defendant
employer or insurance carrier and shall not be construed to
deprive the Employers' Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured
Employers' Fund of any appropriate defenses.
A2

F, Where the answer denies liability solely on the medical
aspects of the case, the applicant through his/her attorney
or agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the
approval of the Commission or its representative, may enter
into a stipulated set of facts, which stipulation, together
with the medical documents bearing on the case in the
commission's file, may be used in making the final
determination of liability.
G, When deemed appropriate, the Commission or its
representative may have a pre-hearing or post-hearing
conference.
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence
discovery with appropriate sets of interrogatories. Such
discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as
well as past and present medical care. The defendant shall
also be entitled to appropriately signed medical releases to
allow gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant
may also require the applicant to submit to an independent
medical examination to be conducted by a physician of the
defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with
such requests may result in the dismissal of a claim or
delay in the scheduling of a hearing.
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery
proceedings and must be signed, unless good cause is shown
for a shorter period, at least one week prior to any
scheduled hearing.
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or
its insurance carrier as a single joint medical exhibit at
least one week before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must
cooperate and submit all pertinent medical records contained
in his file to the employer or its insurance carrier for the
joint exhibit submission two weeks in advance of the
scheduled hearing. Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed
binder arranged by a care provider in chronological order.
Exhibits should include all relevant treatment records with
the exception of hospital nurses notes.
K. The Administrative Law Judge must be notified one week
in advance of any proceeding where it is anticipated that
more than four witnesses will be called, or where it is
anticipated that the hearing of the evidence will require
more than two hours.
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I i Decisions of the presiding officer i n any adjudicative
proceeding will be issued in accordance with the provisions
of Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10, U.C.A
M, Any party to an adjudicative proceeding seeking review
of an Order by the Agency may file a written request for
review in accordance with the provisions of Sections 63-46b12, 63-46b-13, 63-46b-14, 63-46b-15, and 63-46b-16 r ~ '
A Motion for Review of any order entered by an
Administrative Law Judge may be filed pursuant to the
provisions of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A, Unless so filed,
the Order will become the award of the Commission and will
be final. If appropriately filed, the Administrative Law
Judge may:
]
Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order
after holding such further hearing and receiving siich
further evidence as may be deemed necessary,
2
Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental
Order, or
3. Refer the entire case to the C Dmmission for review
under Section 35-1-82.53, U.C.A
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental
Order, as provided above, it shall be final unless a
Motion for Review of the same is filed with the
Commission.
N.
In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Industrial
Commission shall generally foil ow the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure regarding discovery and the issuance of subpoenas,
except as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are modified by
the express provisions of Section 35-1-88, U.C.A., or as may
be otherwise modified by the presiding officer.
0. A request for reconsideration of a Commission's Order on
Motion for Review may be allowed and shall be governed by
the provisions of Section 63-46b-13/ U.C.A. Any petition
for judicial review of the Commission's Order on Motion for
Review shall be governed by the provision of Section 63-46b14, U.C.A.
U t a h Aiiiii ni mi ni
Panel.
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Pursuant to Section 35-1-/7, U.C.A., the Commission adopts
the following guidelines in determining the necessity of
submitting a case to a medical panel:
A
A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law
J udge wherei
A4

1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue
must be shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant medical issues are involved when there
are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5%
of the whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more
than 90 days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting
to more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel
report. Where there is a proffer of new written
conflicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, resubmit the new
evidence to the panel for consideration and
clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an
injured worker to be examined by another physician for
the purpose of obtaining a further medical examination
or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues
involved, and to obtain a report addressing these
medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refuses
to give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to
be non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at
a hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical
examination or evaluation, as directed by the
Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before
commission and hearing examiner - Admissible evidence.
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be
bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of
A5

evidence, or by any technical or f.
. ci. .-t,
other than as herein provided or as
p-;ea ny
zhe
commission pursuant to this act. The commission may make
its investigation in such manner as ir: its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workers'
Compensation Ac t.
The c o r n m i s s i o n m a y receive as evidence and use as proof
of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and
relevant including,, but not limited to the following:
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open
hearings.
(b) Report.: of et^endi^^ -,* exam:!' . ncr physicians. .1 of
pathologists
(c) Reports c: _:. ~
^.
commissioned) Report-- of employers, _ncludi: 4 copies c:. rime
sheets, book accounts or other records.
(e) Hospital records : - -he case ^-F ^Tdiseased employee.
U t a h Code Ann. § 63-4bb~+
adjudicative proceedings.

.^. 1. .

1

(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court
of Appeal has jurisdiction to review all final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2)

(a) To seek judicial review of final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the
petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency
action with the appropriate appellate court in the form
required by the appellate rules of the appropriate
appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate
court shall govern all additional filings and
proceedings in the appellate court.

(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative
proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate
to shorten , summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing
transcripts and copies for the record:

(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its
face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied
the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow
prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject
to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice,
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
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APPENDIX B

Safe and Sound Thinking

F e b r u a r y , $.995

T. JEFFERY COTTLE, ESQUIRE
387 WEST CENTER STREET
OREMUT 84057

RE:

Claimant:
File No,:
Inj. Date:
Employer:

John Kimball
93-17987-8M
3-15-93
Stampede Tn lckii lg

Dear Jeff:
Enclosed, please find all medical records we have collected to date regarding Won.
Compensation Fund claimant John Kimball. These records are not in their final form,, as we are
awaiting updates from, a couple of providers. As soon as those are received and the records •
in their final form, a copy will be made available to yoi i I Jntil, then, I hope these will help

As always, it's a pleasure doing business.
Jincerely,

Michael J. Bowman
Legal Adjuster
288-8055

MB
Enclosure

392 East 6400 South

Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Phone (801) J&8-8000

WCF

Workers
Compensation
Fund of Utah

To:
T. Jeffery Cottle
Attorney at Law
387 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057

P O Box 57929
Salt Lake City Utah 84157 0929

